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FOREWORD
Sid L. Moller*
...virtue must have the quality of aiming at the intermediate.I mean moral virtue;
for it is this that is concernedwith passionsand actions, and in these there is excess,
defect, and the intermediate. Forinstance, bothfear and confidence and appetite and
anger and pity and in generalpleasure and pain may be felt both too much and too
little, and in both cases not well; but to feel them at the right times, with reference to
the right objects, towards the rightpeople, with the right motive and in the right way, is
what is both intermediateand best, and this is characteristicof virtue.
From Book II of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics.
My father, a veteran of many labor contract negotiations, tells of a union official who would often make references to certain abstract and generally obscure
"principles" which prevented the union from compromising its bargaining position. Once, on the occasion of rejecting the company's latest offer for a wage increase, he liberally employed his familiar rhetorical device. When pressed to be
more specific regarding the principle precluding union acquiescence, his response
was, "What principle? I'd say about 15 cents an hour."
In many different contexts, not only labor negotiations, the dollar-and-centsvariety of principal overshadows the principles at issue, and the "bottom line" of a
controversy is simply the bookkeeper's definition of that term. Concerns which
are not so obvious, and therefore less compelling because less obtrusive, are discounted if not completely ignored. And, not surprisingly, it can then at least appear completely self-evident that the only analysis of real consequence is that
which involves money. Needed moderation and a sense of balance are lost in the
commotion.
Such is the case with professional malpractice litigation. Professionals exposed
to expanding theories of liability battle those who promote generous recoveries to
persons supposedly victimized by professionals' wrongdoing. Each marches to a
steady and monotonous beat, bent on getting or retaining, as the case may be, a
larger piece of the pie. A fixation on divvying up the spoils portends other prob-
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lems, however, because civil litigation can only divide, not enlarge, the pie. What
follows, then, is a contentious and seemingly endless dispute, maybe not for individual litigants but certainly for the participants in the aggregate. So long as the
discourse is dominated by such considerations, there will be a rather fundamental
polarization of interests and an improbability of meaningful and lasting peace. Instead, perhaps the best to be hoped for is an ongoing cold war; more likely, the
uneasy truce will not hold at all, and the combatants will continue to devote substantial amounts of time, energy and economic resources to waging and eventually
escalating the war. In the process, one generation of professionals (especially doctors, and, to a lesser extent, virtually all other professionals) will perceive itself
under siege and teach the next to revile attorneys and distrust the legal system.
And, in like manner, self-interested segments of the legal community may never
consider the option of beating certain of their swords into plowshares, even if that
would be ultimately beneficial to the citizenry.
A fresh and maybe even daring way of looking at professional malpractice disputes must be constructed, beginning with a recognition of the warped outlook
brought about by that singular focus on money which invariably reduces debate to
the lowest common denominator of our values. Because of its undeniable significance, money will of necessity always play a prominent role in this type of litigation. But other vital factors are also involved, and they, too, need to be addressed
and integrated into the formula for resolving professional malpractice cases. Taking these additional factors into account should elevate the debate and help to create a methodology which is sounder, if only because it produces a stronger
consensus that justice is being rendered.
Given human nature, one might question whether it is realistic to expect the repudiation of a single-minded focus on the pecuniary aspects of these cases. We can
at least change the tenor of malpractice litigation by actively exploring the nonmonetary issues presented by the controversies. Even modest steps in this direction can avail much, because in addition to redefining the issues, shifting the focus
more to non-pecuniary concerns will also necessarily contribute to a more humane perspective of the participants. When the primary considerations are financial, deep-pocketed professionals are obviously seen as attractive defendants. But
lucre aside, they are also human beings who have much to lose from being sued.
On the other hand, if pecuniary considerations do not dominate the controversy,
professionals may more readily accept the fact that some injured patients, clients,
parishioners, etc., have had their lives profoundly altered by the mistakes of their
professional colleagues. Such insights should lead to the recognition that, for better or worse, our legal system is the only mechanism by which these injured parties can obtain redress.
Having said all this, and especially after having proclaimed the benefit of even
"modest" efforts at redefining the issues, a thought or two on a possible reorientation of perspective and modification of the system's handling of professional malpractice cases is in order. In my mind, the discontent among participants in
malpractice cases, especially the professionals, has a great deal to do with the fact
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that non-lawyers tend to interpret determinations of civil liability as moral pronouncements. For many lay persons, the victor in a malpractice action has been
adjudicated as good, deserving, virtuous, blameless, or upright; the loser as bad,
undeserving, corrupt, defective, or iniquitous. The rhetoric of closing arguments
notwithstanding, for most judges, lawyers and others sophisticated in the legal
process, dispensing justice in civil actions no longer resonates with such moral
overtones. Thus, litigants and lawyers view the proceedings from fundamentally
different perspectives. Perhaps more significant is the fact that the decisions often
do not correlate with the professional's own sense of right and wrong. We need to
more closely analyze the ramifications of these disparate views.
Consider what is at stake for the defendant in a professional malpractice case
aside from money. We all know of the tendency of people to model their behavior
against the backdrop of a personal sense of what is honorable. While a professional
may be a member of the general populace, to a greater or lesser extent, his or her
primary frame of reference is the sub-culture of the profession. In this regard, numerous and varied influences -including one's education, formal and informal
mentoring processes, hero worship, daily work activities, institutional norms,
and associations with others engaged in a like calling -combine to shape an image
of "the right stuff' for that particular profession. Only the staunchest of renegades,
and perhaps not even them if they truly remain "in" the profession, are able to refrain from embracing certain fundamental aspects of the group's norms. The
model citizen of a professional sub-culture, a conjectural embodiment of the ideal,
provides a symbolic but nonetheless real standard by which members of the profession measure themselves and evaluate their actions.
Theoretically, the legal standards for imposing civil liability are not significantly divergent from the profession's own standards. In actuality, however, the
standards are quite different. Perhaps the divergence has always existed; but certainly as the law of malpractice in past years has slipped from fault-based standards to stricter forms of liability, the gap between the professional sub-culture's
standards and the standards by which liability is imposed has widened. When a
professional who is of the opinion that he or she is performing in accordance with
the norms of a relevant sub-culture is informed by the courts that such performance is unacceptable, an incongruity is created. Thus a dissonant chord is struck
which, as with music, sounds harsh and incomplete until resolved to a harmonious
chord.
In attempting to resolve such dissonance, the professional has rather limited options. He or she may become somewhat self-critical, even to the point of rejecting
previously-held views regarding the acceptable norms of the profession. Alternatively, he or she may become disillusioned with the legal system and assume the
role of either aggressive guerrilla or retiring exile. Whether active or passive in
their resistance, such disenfranchised professionals would probably agree that the
system has been taken over by an evil, competing sub-culture (the lawyers). To the
extent that my personal acquaintances are valid indicators, most professionals are
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indeed rather disillusioned by the perils of professional malpractice; few respond
with self-criticism and rejection of the profession's norms.
One can empathize with professionals who perceive that activities acceptable
within their own sub-culture are condemned by a legal system that plays by a different and somewhat bewildering set of rules. But such empathy on this point must
not prevent an honest appraisal of the contributions professionals themselves
make to the shortcomings of our method of compensating victims of malpractice.
We have recognized the need to protect the professional's sense of honor, but it
must also be said that honor or pride can be taken to excess, and that hubris, as the
ancient Greeks called it, also produces rather unpalatable fruit. Hubris among professionals does indeed tend to manifest itself in a somewhat revolting manner,
when there is a refusal to acknowledge the responsibility of the relevant profession
for the mistakes of its practitioners.
Simply stated, a particular profession must accept the frailties of humanity, its
own members included, and concede that reparations are warranted in some circumstances for those victimized by the profession's failings. Perhaps few professionals disagree with this statement in the abstract, but when it translates to the
goring of one's own ox in the form of a lawsuit or increased malpractice insurance
premiums, consensus soon fades. Because reparations cost money, where a member of the relevant profession is truly at fault, who should pay? Should the losses
be absorbed by the victims themselves? Or, alternatively, should the victims be
steered directly or indirectly to the public trough, and forced to become dependant
upon government largesse for their maintenance and restoration? The obvious answer is that neither the victims nor the state should be responsible, but rather those
who caused the harm, especially when one considers the fact that professionals are
among the most highly compensated members of our society.
Where do these trails lead? Not only to the conclusion that change is needed,
but also to the recognition that such change should include compromises and reflect a spirit of moderation. Ideally, reform should effectuate a change from the
present emphasis on pecuniary concerns, which is nothing short of extraordinary.
It should also be predicated on a recognition of a professional's pride and sense of
honor in his or her professional status, but not allow such pride to operate unchecked, thereby insulating the professional from civil liability when justice demands otherwise. In other words, what is needed is more of a sense of balance,
calling to mind certain of Aristotle's thoughts defining moral virtue.
To the extent that these reflections are indicative of beliefs held by many others,
and not simply the idiosyncratic if not sentimental musings of the author, one
might anticipate attempts at reform which address the concerns raised herein. Predicting the particulars of such reform is a precarious business, but I believe that
some of the more general contours of future developments in this area of the law
have already begun to emerge.
First, in years to come, professional malpractice disputes will move out of the
court system, as resolution of these cases is handed over to administrative decisionmakers. Such adjudicatory agencies will almost certainly include representa-
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tive members of the profession over which they sit in judgment, so as to promote
convergence of the profession's norms with the standards by which liability is
measured. Secondly, I would anticipate that where it is feasible, no-fault schemes
will be implemented. For obvious reasons, such systems remove much of the
stigma of liability for professionals. On the other hand, the profession remains responsible with such systems for shouldering the burden of making reparations for
its mistakes. Finally, as a consequence of the first two developments, claimant recoveries will be increasingly uniform. This is the nature of an administrative
body, to standardize its product, as does any mass producer. It is also the quidpro
quo for no-fault, as typified by the worker's compensation model. In any event,
the standardization of awards, which will also involve a minimization of the likelihood of outlandishly high recoveries and a probable reduction of the overall average of awards, will result in a de-emphasis of pecuniary concerns.
The somewhat quaint ring of the terms honor and hubris are enough to confirm
that they are not in vogue. And, perhaps other thoughts herein, such as those relating to the need for virtue and balance, also appear a bit old-fashioned, or at least
out of place in a modern analysis of legal decisionmaking. But consider the revolutionary changes in the law relating to professional malpractice that have occurred over the past 50 or even 25 years. Most have been brought on by
tumultuous changes in numerous areas, including technology, consumerism, the
delivery of legal services, and attitudes toward victim compensation. We can most
certainly anticipate that none of these will stand still in the future. Consequently,
as we contemplate repairs and alterations of the edifice, it is first necessary to excavate down to a stable substratum and ground ourselves on those things that do
remain constant. Some of the more consequential attributes of human character,
like honor and hubris, seem to qualify in this regard, as does the need for a legal
system which dispenses a brand of justice more compatible with the views of justice embraced by those who come before it.

